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DOES TORT LAW HAVE A FUTURE?
Ernest J. Weinrib"
I.
Does tort law have a future? Not long ago this question would have
referred to the prospect that compensation plans might supplant

significant portions of tort law.'

During the twentieth century such

plans washed over the common law world in successive tides, reaching a
high water mark in the comprehensive New Zealand scheme of 1974.
Since then, for better or worse, the movement to replace tort law has
2
waned, as some of its most influential 'champions have acknowledged.
By asking about tort law's future today, I refer not to this external
threat but to the internal corruption of tort law's conceptual structure. In
4
my Monsanto Lecture twelve years ago3 (and in other work), I
contended that the doctrinal elements of liability relate the defendant
and the plaintiff to each other as the doer and the sufferer of the same
injustice. Understood in this way, tort law is utterly incompatible with
instrumentalist accounts, which inevitably treat the parties in
relationship not to each other but to goals that apply independently to
each of them.
The future of tort law is tied to these issues in the following way.
Tort law is a normative practice under which courts determine liability
in accordance with the justifications that inform its characteristic
concepts. Because liability is bipolar - the liability of the defendant is
necessarily a liability to the plaintiff - those justifications are coherent
only if they simultaneously embrace both parties by treating them as
correlatively situated through the injustice done by the defendant and
suffered by the plaintiff. Then a reason for considering the defendant to
have done an injustice is also a reason for considering the plaintiff to
have suffered that injustice. Conversely, a justification that does not
match this bipolarity favours one of the parties at the expense of the
other. It thereby fails to be fair from the standpoint of both. When such

University Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. I am indebted to Sophia
Reibetanz for her comments on an earlier version.
John G. Fleming, Is There a Futurefor Tort?, 44 LA. L REv. 1193 (1984).
Rt, Hon. Prof. Sir Geoffrey Palmer, 7e Design of Compensation Systems: Tort Principles
Rule, O.K.?, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1115 (1995); Patrick Atiyah, THE DAMAGES LOITERY (1997).
Ernest J. Weinrib, UnderstandingTort Law, 23 VAL U. L. REv. 485 (1989).
See Ernest J. Weinrib, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAw (1995).
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justifications become entrenched, the concepts and institutions
expressive of bipolarity (for example, causation or the bilateral civil
action) become external faqades emptied of their inner normative
meaning. Tort law then forfeits its future as a fair and coherent
justificatory enterprise
In this symposium of millennial reflections, I focus on the negligence
categories of duty and proximate cause. The elucidation of these
categories in landmark cases throughout the common law world was
perhaps the outstanding achievement of tort law in the twentieth
century. The significance of these cases is that they, articulate the
bipolarity of the relationship between the doer and the sufferer of
negligent injury. In the United States this significance has in recent years
been largely overlooked - as is hardly surprising given the
instrumentalism that has held American legal thinking firmly in its grip
over the last decades.
More surprising, as I shall indicate, are
developments in my own country, Canada, where instrumentalism's
legal roots are comparatively shallow.
II.
How do duty and proximate cause relate the parties to each other?
Negligence liability spans the sequence from the defendant's creation of
an unreasonable risk to the materialization of that risk in injury to the
plaintiff. For this sequence to constitute the same injustice for the two
parties, the wrongfulness of both the defendant's action and the
plaintiff's injury must be referable to the same sort of risk. Accordingly,
the function of duty and proximate cause is to link wrongdoing and
injury through the description of the risk appropriate to the facts of the
case. Duty connects the defendant as a wrongdoer to the plaintiff as a
member of the class of persons wrongfully put at risk. Similarly,
proximate cause connects the defendant's negligence to the plaintiff's
suffering of the kind of injury or accident the risk of which rendered the
defendant's act wrongful.
The leading twentieth century cases on duty and proximate cause
gave legal expression to this conception of negligence liability. Three
developments were particularly noteworthy. The first was the great
decision by the House of Lords in Donoghue v. Stevensons (and its

5

1932 App. Cas. 562 (H.L.).
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American predecessor MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.).6 In place of a
fragmented set of duties that varied according to the particular
contractual status of the parties, Donoghue articulated "a general
conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care." 7 This general duty
mandated the exercise of due care towards anyone whose injury was the
Donoghue
reasonably foreseeable consequence of one's conduct.
established that, for purposes of negligence, the doing and suffering of
injustice flowed from the doer's risk-creating action as such and from its
reasonably foreseeable effect on the sufferer, rather than from particular
social and contractual relationships that were but instances of such risk-.
creation.
The second development was Cardozo's judgment in Palsgrafv. Long
Island Railroad Co.,8 which precluded liability unless the defendant's
breach of duty was a wrong in relation to the plaintiff's right. Because in
that case the defendant's conduct was not wrongful toward the plaintiff
(although it was arguably wrongful toward someone else), the defendant
was held not to be under a duty with respect to the plaintiff's loss. Only
if the wrongfulness of the defendant's risk-creation was relative to the
plaintiff's right could the parties be regarded as doer and sufferer of the
same injustice. Cardozo's achievement was to align the relational
significance of risk, as a foreseeable effect on another, with the relational
nature of tortious wrongdoing as the violation of the plaintiff's right.
Consequently, the plaintiff had to be within the class of persons whose
rights were foreseeably affected by the defendant's unreasonable
creation of risk.
The third development was the Privy Council's decision in the
Wagon Mound case,9 which held the requirement of proximate cause
unsatisfied when the defendant negligently exposes the plaintiff to the
risk of one kind of injury, but the plaintiff suffers an injury of a different
kind. This decision made proximate cause run parallel to Cardozo's
conception of duty, by requiring that the plaintiff suffer the kind of harm
that was within the ambit of the risk unreasonably created by the
defendant.10 Only when the prospect of a loss like the one the plaintiff

111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of
MacP erson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1773 (1998).
7 Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 App. Cas. 562, 580 (H.L).
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
Overseas Tankship (UK) v. Morts Dock and Engineering (Wagon Mound No. 1), 1961
App. Cas. 388 (P.C.).
10 The connection of Wagon Mound and Palsgrafis sharply put in the leading text on tort
law in the United States: "The decision is the logical aftermath of Cardozo's decision in the
6
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suffered is what renders the defendant's conduct wrongful do the parties
stand to each other as the active and passive poles of the same injustice.
As a result of this complex of leading cases, the main categories of
negligence liability - duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, factual cause
- form a coherent set that traces the sequence from the defendant's
negligent act to the plaintiff's injury. Breach of duty and factual
causation are the termini of this -sequence, with the former referring to
the defendant's creation of unreasonable risk and the latter to the
materialization of risk in injury to the plaintiff. Duty and proximate
cause link these termini by characterizing the wrongfulness of what the
defendant did and what the plaintiff suffered in terms of the same risk.
The result is that the parties can be seen as the doer and sufferer of the
same injustice, which the law then remedies by holding the doer liable to
the sufferer.
Although versions of this conception of negligence law had
prominent advocates in the United States - for example, Warren Seavey"
and Robert Keeton 12 - it never fully took hold there. The reason for this
is that for decades, highly sophisticated instrumental approaches have
dominated tort thinking in the United States. Nurtured by the Realists'
scepticism about the stability of legal concepts and by the Holmsian
preoccupation with policy, these instrumentalisms analyse tort law in
terms of goals that are independent both of one another and of the
relationship between the parties. For example, Guido Calabresi's classic
article on the very cases I have mentioned treats negligence law as an
unintegrated amalgam of competing goals (market deterrence, collective
deterrence, spreading, and wealth distribution) that operate through
disconnected legal concepts.' 3 This kind of thinking leaves no room for a
conception of negligence law in which each party's position is the
correlate of the other's because the same wrong applies to both sides.

Palsgraf case, since there is an obvious absurdity in holding that one who can foresee some
harm to A is liable to consequences to A which he cannot foresee, but is not liable for
similar consequences to B." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 296 (5th ed. 1984). A similar point was made in the Wagon Mound opinion. Wagon
Mound, 1961 App. Cas. at 425.
11 Warren A. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 372 (1939).
Concurrently published in 39 COLUM.L. REV. 20 (1939) and 48 YALE L.J. 390.
12 ROBERT KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1963).

Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essayfor Harry Kalven, Jr., 43
U. CHI. L.REV. 69 (1975).
13
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In contrast, in the Commonwealth this conception of negligence
formed the backbone of analysis. Commonwealth courts had to
determine whether the plaintiff's injury could plausibly be regarded as
the fruition of the unreasonable risk that rendered the defendant's action
wrongful. This exercise required a contextualized treatment of the
plaintiff's injury in terms of the reason for considering the defendant's
action to be wrongful, with wrongfulness itself being evaluated by
reference to who and what was at risk and to how danger might come to
pass. 14 The analysis involved not mechanically applicable tests, but
casuistic assessments of each case and analogic reasoning from one case
to another. Certain formulae arose to orient the mind (for example, that
liability required foreseeability of the type of the injury but not of the
extent or the precise manner of its occurrence). Decided cases illustrated
the leeways of judgment. Of course, in interpreting the facts for
purposes of liability, the judge had to have an idea of what to look for,
and the general conception of duty was useful as "a guide to
characteristics that will be found to exist in conduct and relationships." Is
In this way the casuistic determination of liability was conducted under
the aegis of concepts of duty and proximate cause that link the plaintiff's
action and the plaintiff's suffering through a single notion of wrongful
risk applied correlatively to both parties.
III.
In recent years, however, Commonwealth jurisdictions have
experimented with a different approach to duty and proximate cause.
Cutting through the need for casuistic elucidations, the English courts
formulated and subsequently abandoned a two-stage test that the
Supreme Court of Canada has continued to apply. In its current
Canadian formulation the two-stage test goes as follows:
In order to decide whether or not a private law duty of
care existed, two questions must be asked:
1. is there a sufficiently close relationship between
the parties...
so that in the reasonable
contemplation of the [defendant], carelessness on its
part might cause damage to [the plaintiff]? If so,

As Cardozo observed in Palsgraf,"risk imports relation." Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 100.
Home Office v. Dorset Yacht, 1970 App. Cas. 1004, 1060 (Lord Diplock) (providing the
most extensive judicial discussion of the methodology of applying Lord Atkin's general
conception of duty).
14

15
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there any considerations that ought to
or limit (a) the scope of the duty (b) the
persons to whom it is owed or (c) the
16
to which the breach of it may give rise?

The first stage of this formulation incorporates the traditional
language of foreseeability to establish a primafacie duty. At this stage the
judge attempts to discern "whether, as a matter of simple justice, the
defendant may be said to have had an obligation to be mindful of the
plaintiff's interests." 17 The second stage allows that primafacie duty to be
circumscribed or cancelled because of the presence of "policy concerns
that are extrinsic to simple justice but that are nevertheless
fundamentally important."1 8
The two-stage test has radically altered negligence law in Canada.
Negligence analysis no longer consists in scrutinizing the parties'
relationship in the light of a coherent series of concepts. The mode of
argument that underpinned the great doctrinal achievements that I
mentioned earlier has been abandoned. Instead of examining whether
the materialization of the risk created by the defendant is an injustice to
the plaintiff, the Court now canvasses a melange of justice and policy
considerations.
This momentous change has several questionable
features.
First, in the final analysis the decisive factor in liability is the
importance of the policy considerations relevant to the second stage.
These considerations are uncontrolled by the relationship between the
parties and indeed may be beyond the court's institutional competence
to judge. A plaintiff can therefore be denied compensation on the basis
of policy considerations that, while one-sidedly pertinent to the
defendant or to persons carrying on a similar activity, have no normative
bearing on the position of the plaintiff as the sufferer of an injustice.
From the plaintiff's point of view, the denial of recovery, operating (as
the Court says) extrinsically to simple justice, amounts to the judicial
confiscation of what is rightly due to the plaintiff in order to subsidize
policy objectives unilaterally favorable to the defendant and those
similarly situated.

16 Kamloops v. Nielsen [1984] 10 D.Lr4th 641, 662 (Can.).

17 Hercules Managements v. Ernst & Young [1997] 146 D.L.R.4th 577,591 (Can.).
Is Id.
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Second, even as policy analysis the second stage is one-sided. It
refers only to policy considerations that negative liability, not to those
that might confirm liability.
Under the Court's formulation, the
plaintiff's claim for compensation is entirely constituted by the first
stage; the second stage deals only with factors favourable to defendants.
For example, a recent case decided that a mother was not liable for the
pre-natal injuries that she caused her own child by her negligent
driving.1 9 Although injury was foreseeable under the first stage, the
Court negated liability on policy grounds in order to safeguard the
pregnant woman's autonomy and privacy. However, the Court also
rejected the suggestion that the existence of a mandatory automobile
insurance regime justified liability on policy grounds. Thus, a judicially
enunciated policy prevented the victim of negligent driving from
gaining access to insurance proceeds whose availability had been
legislated. Elsewhere the Court had affirmed that insurance is a policy
factor that negatives liability, 20 but apparently it cannot be invoked to
support liability.
Third, the relationship between plaintiff and defendant is
fragmented not only by the recourse to instrumental policy concerns, but
also by the disjunction between the justice and policy considerations of
the two stages. This disjunction, in turn, requires judges to balance
categorically different considerations, in order to determine whether in a
given case the policy considerations are more important than the justice
considerations that they can displace.
How is this balancing of
incommensurables to be done? In effect, the two-stage test puts into
circulation two different normative currencies between which no rate of
exchange exists.
Fourth, the two-stage test transfigures the notion of foreseeability
itself. When considered within the framework of injustice done and
suffered, foreseeability is an intrinsically bipolar notion that links the
plaintiff's injury to the reason for characterizing the defendant's action as
wrongful. Accordingly, foreseeability is internally limited by the scope
of the wrongfulness to which it refers. In contrast, under the two-stage
test, foreseeability constitutes a "relatively low threshold" 2' for
recognizing a prima facie duty, which is then extrinsically limited by
.policy considerations.
Any prospective damage counts as being

19Dobson v. Dobson [1999] 174 D.L.R.1, 31 (Can.).
20 Canadian Nat'l Ry. v. Norsk Pacific S.S. [1992] 91 D.L.R.4th 289 (Can.).
21 Ingles v. City of Toronto [2000] 183 D.L.R.4th 193, 202 (Can.); Ryan v. City of Victoria
[1999] 168 D.L.R.4th 513, 524 (Can.).
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foreseeable under the first stage of the test, without inquiry into why the
defendant's action should be characterized as a wrongful infringement
of the plaintiff's right.22
Moreover, although the two-stage test
postulates the existence of "a sufficiently close connection between the
parties," that connection is not analyzed normatively, in terms of the
reason for characterizing the defendant's action as a wrong relative to
the plaintiff's right. Instead, the connection is pictured in terms of
physical images of proximity that are motivated by the specter of
unlimited liability that the two-stage test itself has let loose.2 3 This
broadening of foreseeability is accentuated by its functioning as part of a
"test" rather than (as it was for Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson)24
merely an aspect of the framework for thinking of the relationship
between the parties.
In short, the introduction of the two-stage test has transformed
Canadian negligence law into an enquiry into one-sided policy factors
that are extrinsic to justice between the parties and that are mysteriously
balanced against an excessively expansive notion of foreseeability. This
enquiry is hardly conducive to the elaboration of coherent and
principled justifications for liability.
WV.
A pair of recent cases illustrates these themes. In the past few years
the highest courts in England and then in Canada have dealt with the
liability of auditors for negligently preparing the annual report of a
corporation's accounts. As is well known, investors in the stock market
rely on the information in these reports. Previously, accountants had
been held liable for the reliance losses caused by negligence in a report

22 See KEETON Er AL., supra

note 11, at 55. The author observes that:

putting the crucial question in terms of whether the injuries were
foreseeable... carries the misleading implication that the scope of
legal responsibility extends to every consequence that is foreseeable as
a possibility in any degree... The crucial standard is better expressed
as the question whether all her injuries were within those risks by

reason of which the defendants' conduct was characterized as
negligence.

id.

A paradigmatic example is the treatment of liability for economic loss suffered by the
plaintiff because of damage caused to something owned by a third party. See Canadian
Nat'l Ry. v. Norsk Pacific S.S. [1992] 91 D.L.R.4th 289 (Can.).
24 Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 App. Cas. 562, 580 (H.L.). In Dorset Yacht v. Home Office,
Lord Diplock remarked about Lord Atkin's general conception of relations giving rise to a
duty of care, that "misused as a universal it is manifestly false." Dorset Yacht v. Home
Office, 1970 App. Cas. 1004,1060.
23
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they knew was prepared for the guidance of a specific class of investors
with respect to a specific class of transactions.25 The question that now
arose was whether investors generally could recover for their admittedly
foreseeable reliance on statements in a report prepared for the
corporation's annual meeting. Both the English and the Canadian courts
answered in the negative, but they used different modes of reasoning.
For the House of Lords,2 6 the crucial issue was whether the requisite
normative link existed between the defendant's negligence and the
plaintiff's loss. Foreseeability of the loss could not ground liability,
because the duty of care could not be considered in abstraction from the
kind of damage which the defendant must avoid causing. In this case
the audit was presented to fulfil a statutory obligation aimed at the
informed exercise by the corporation's stakeholders of their powers of
corporate governance. Because the plaintiff's loss was not connected to
the purpose of the audit, the defendant owed no duty of care with
respect to that loss.
The Canadian case 27 followed the English decision in result but
transformed the structure of its thought. Applying the two-stage test,
the Supreme Court of Canada determined that a prima facie duty of care
arose because investor reliance on the audit was foreseeable. This duty,
however, was negated by the undesirable social consequences of the
indeterminate liability generated by so broad a conception of
foreseeability. Among these consequences were the increased insurance
premiums, the higher costs faced by accountants, the opportunity costs
in time spent on litigation rather than on generating accounting revenue,
reduction in the availability in accounting services as marginal firms are
driven to the wall, and increased costs for consumers. Looking to the
purpose of the auditor's report, as was done in the English case, was, "in
reality, nothing more that a means by which to circumscribe - for reasons
2
of policy - the scope of the representor's potentially unlimited liability" 8
The contrast between these two cases is stark. The English judgment
straightforwardly applied the mode of reasoning set out in the classic
twentieth century cases mentioned earlier.
The House of Lords
examined whether the investor suffered the kind of loss that lies within

2 Haig v. Bamford [1976] 72 D.LR.3d 68 (Can.).
26 Caparo Industries v. Dickman, 1 All E.R. 568 (1990). For an illuminating discussion of
this case, see Chapman, Limited Auditors' Liability: Economic Analysis and the Theory of Tort
Law, 20 CAN. Bus. L. J. 180 (1992).
21 Hercules Managements v. Ernst & Young [1997] 146 D.L.R.4th 577,591 (Can.).
n Id.
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the scope of the auditor's duty, which, in turn, was defined and limited
by the purpose for which the audit was required. Given that such audits
are not prepared for the guidance of decisions to buy or sell shares, the
defendant could not be viewed as having assumed responsibility for the
plaintiff's losses. Because these investment transactions fell outside the
range of the defendant's duty, the plaintiff's loss, despite being the
foreseeable outcome of a negligently prepared report, did not count as
the suffering of a wrong at the defendant's hands. In this judgment the
purpose of the audit functions as the normative idea through which the
court considers the connection between parties. The reasoning isrelational throughout, and liability is denied because the plaintiff's loss is
not normatively correlated to the defendant's negligence. 29
The Canadian case transforms this relational reasoning into a policybased restriction on liability. Foreseeability, now no longer situated
within the framework of doing and suffering the same injustice, creates a
prima facie duty that is "potentially infinite." To solve this problem of its
own creation, the Court curtails the scope of the duty by reference to
policy factors. Hence, what the Court calls the simple justice of the
plaintiff's claim yields to the need to preserve the availability of
accounting services in Canada. The Court does not explain why justice
is to be sacrificed to the need for accounting services, or why the policy
to maintain accounting services outweighs the policy of deterrence, or
how the Court knows that the current level of accounting services in
Canada is optimal. Instead of offering reasons for thinking that the
defendant did not wrong the plaintiff, the Court indulges in speculations
beyond its competence about the undesirable consequences of liability
for the providers and consumers of accounting services.
These particular differences in the two judgments reflect a wider
contrast between the nature of the justifications that they employ. The
Engish judgment assumes that the justifications relevant to liability
The following passage from the English case is a striking judicial formulation of the
notion of that the sequence from negligence to injury forms a single normative unit:
[A] postulated duty of care must be stated with reference to the kind of
damage that the plaintiff has suffered and in reference to the plaintiff
or the class of which the plaintiff is a member... His duty of care is a
thing written on the wind unless damage is caused by the breach of
that duty; there is no actionable negligence unless duty, breach and
consequential damage coincide...; for the purpose of determining
liability in a given case, each element can be defined only in terms of
the others.
Caparo Industries v. Dickman, 1 All E.R. 568, 599 (1990) (per Lord Oliver) (quoting Council
of the Shire of Sutherland v. Heyman (1985) 60 A.L.R. 1, 48 (Austl.) (per Brennan, J.).
29
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embrace both parties as the doer and the sufferer of the same injustice.
Because of liability's correlative significance for both parties, such
justifications are required if a judgment is to provide coherent reasons
for considering whether one party is liable to the other. Conversely, a
court that decided issues of liability without reference to such
justifications fails to treat the parties fairly in relation to each other. The
Canadian judgment provides an example of this.
Its expansive
conception of foreseeability at the first stage focuses on the prospective
damage that might result from the defendant's action without
articulating the reason for regarding that damage as a wrongful
infringement of the plaintiff's right. Similarly, its restrictive elucidation
of policy at the second stage deals only with the effect of liability on
accountants and is thus unrelated to the plaintiff's claim to have suffered
a wrong. The effect is that the judgment contains a series of unintegrated
considerations that are divorced from the articulation of the wrong that
might link the parties to the action. Such considerations are inherently
incapable of fairly and coherently determining whether the defendant
should be held liable to the plaintiff.
If tort law is to be a fair and coherent normative practice, it must
determine liability on the basis of justifications that link the plaintiff and
the defendant. This in turn requires that the central concepts of tort law
be construed as the normative markers for the doing and suffering of a
wrong. The great cases of twentieth century negligence law gave voice
to this conception of liability. The challenge for the next century is
whether this legacy can be maintained and developed. This project is
inconsistent with the introduction of instrumentalist notions of policy
that fragment the relationship between the parties and transform the
law's concern from the wrong done and suffered to the choice of social
goals. The Canadian example indicates that even jurisdictions without
strong instrumentalist roots may lose sight of the need to elucidate tort
law in terms of the normative relationship between the parties. When
that happens, tort law has no future as a fair and coherent justificatory
enterprise.
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